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ABSTRACT
UnitedStates tax law distinguishes between short—term and long—term
capital gains. By taxing long—term gains at a lower rate the law creates
an incentive for investors to postpone the realization of short—term gains.
This study examines the lock—in effect induced by the differential tax
treatment of long— and short—term gains. Analysis of data on corporate
stock transactions from 1973 suggests that the lock—in effect is large and,
thus, causes investors to alter their investment portfolios. The existence
of such an effect is inefficient and results in a reduction in capital
market efficiency.
The inefficiency might be justified if there were convincing reasons
which supported the existence of the holding period distinction. It is
commonly argued, for instance, that eliminating the distinction would
encourageshort—term speculation at the expense of long—term commitment
to capital. It is also claimed that this would result in a loss of revenue
tothe government. This study relies on IRS data and simulations using
the NBER—TAXSIM file to examine the validity of these arguments. The
results of this study suggest that the holding period distinction is not
very effective in deterring speculation and does not increase government
revenues; in fact, it may decrease them.
Steven Kaplan
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Under current United States tax law, all capital asset sales are not
created equal. The law distinguishes between short—term and long—term
transactions. Although therelevant holdingperiod has changed over time, this
distinction has existed since 1921.1 Currently, short—term gains are taxedas
ordinary income while only 10% of long—term gains are so taxed. Similarly, up
to $3,000 of short—term losses may be deducted from income while only 50% of
long—term losses (up to $3,000) may be deducted.2
This differential tax treatment creates incentives for investors not to
realize short—term gains. Fredland et al.(1968) use aggregate dat,a to suggest
that investors do respond to these incentives, investors are locked—in to short—
term gains. In the first section of this paper, their analysis is discussed and
retested using more recent IRS data. Additional evidence is presented by
looking at investor behavior using data on individual corporate stock transac-
tions for 1913. The pattern of short—term gain realizations over time supports
the hypothesis that an important lock—in effect exists.
The existence of such an effect is inefficient and results in a
loss of capital market efficiency. Investors respond to the differential tax
treatment by holding portfolios they would not otherwise hold. The inefficiency
might be justified if there were compelling reasons which support the holding
period distinction. In sections 2 and 3, the arguments commonly presented in
favor of the distinction are analyzed. IRS data and the ffBER—TAXSIM program are
used to show that these argunents are of questionable merit because they tend to
concentrate on short—term gains while they ignore short—term losses.
* . NationalBureau of Economic Research and Harvard University.
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1.The Lock—in Effect
The theoretical motivation for the lock—in effect caused by the dif-
ferential taxtreatment of capital gains is relatively easy to show. Following
the analysis of Holt and Shelton (1962), assume that an investor is risk
neutral. He owns a short—term asset, B, worth, which he bought at W0(l—c).
He must decide whether to realize the gain immediately and reinvest it in
another asset, A, or to wait until the short—term gain becomes a long—term gain
and then realize it. Assets A and B have expected retiirns Ba2 and
respectively. The investor's short—term tax rate, 2r, is twice that of his
long—term rate.3 Also, assume that investment A willbetaxed as a long—term
gain when it is realized. The investor, thus faces the decision:
(1)max[E {(1+b2
—tb2-ic)}, E{(l—2Tc)(l+a2(l-T)) }
Itfollows that the investor will sell if:
(2) Ba2 — >Ba2 (2Tc) +
Toinduce the investor to switch, the expected return on asset A must exceed
that on asset B by a difference that is an increasing function of both tandc;
as the investor's tax rate or as his accrued gain on asset B increases, the
investor becomes increasingly locked—in to asset B.If c=.2 and t=.2, the
expected return on asset A must exceed that on asset B by at least 5%. This is
a large difference for such a short period of time (less than one year).
An analysis of a risk averse investor with a quadratic utility func-
tion yields similar results.—3--
Fredland et al.(1968) present convincing evidence that investors are
locked—in to short—term gains. They demonstrate that realizations of capital
gains on corporate stock in 1962 increased significantly when the holding period
on those gains reached six months. Thhle 1 presents the amount of capital gains
realized in 1913 on corporate stock by holding period and AGI. The gross gain
realized on all returns decreases monotonically for holding periods from under
one month to five—six months, and then increases dramatically at six—seven and
seven—eight months when, presumably, investors realize the gains (now long—term)
they had postponed realizing earlier. This behavior is characteristic of all
income classes, although it is most pronounced for those taxpayers with AGI's
greater than $100,000. We would expect this behavior to be more pronounced if
it were possible to separate those investors with a net gain from those with a
net loss for the year. These results are qualitatively similar to those
obtained by Fredland et al, and support the hypothesis that investors are locked—
in to short—term gains. This effect increases as the time the asset has been
held approaches the long—term short—term transition.._14 —
Table1
Gross Gains on Corporate Stock Transactions
By AGI and Length of Period Held, 1913
(in millions of dollars)
AGI
Holding All Under 10,000— 50,000— Over
Period Returns 10,000 50,000 100,000 100,000
(months)
Under 1 163.5 3.1 80.2 314.8 33.0
1—2 1124.9 16.2 22.14 16.8
2—3 io6.6 1.9 55.5 11.8 i14.
3J4 15.6 2.1 38.8 13.2 12.1
145 67.9 .5 39.9 124.9 9.6
5—6 1414.9 1.0 23.4 9.3 7.8
6—7' 153.24 2.9 6i.6 39.2 145.5
7—8 132.7 54.6 23.7 15.14 23.24
8—9 99.4 20.9 31.8 19.8 25.1
9—10 96.2 1.8 414•14 22.24 24.7'
10—11 53.1 1. 7 15.9 14.7 i6. 6
11—12 60.6 1.0 12.9 16.3 21.7'—5—
Thepreceding analysis has shown that there is a lock—in effect asso-
ciated with short—term gain—taking behavior. It was asserted that this effect
increases as the time the asset has been held nears the short—terra long—term
transition. The dollar amount of short—term gains realized decreases as the
transition time nears. The size of each short—term gain realized as a percen-
tage of purchase price, however, should not decrease monotonically with time.
To see this, assume that the investor has bought an asset at a price PO• Let
be the price of that asset at time i. Although some of the investments the
investor makes will turn out to be losers, ignore these for the moment and con-
sider only the gainers. In this situation, the distribution of gains (or to
normalize for all investments, gain as a percentage of purchase price, gain/p0)
would be expected to change over time. As shown in Figure 1, the longer an
asset is held, the greater will be the variance of percentage gains. The
average percentage gain (conditional on the sale being a gain) will also
increase as a function of time. Over a relatively short period of time, such as
six months, this increase will be approximately linear.
If an investor has a short—terra gain, he will decide to realize it as
a short—term gain rather than as a long—term gain if he expects to attain a
greater utility by doing so. Assume, again, that an investor is risk neutral
and holds asset B worth $l+g, which he bought at $1. He must decide whether to
realize the asset now and reinvest it in A, or to hold asset B until it becomes
a long—term asset. Assets A and B have expected returns a2(I—i) and b2(I—i)







hasheld asset B and I—i is the length of time until asset B becomes a long—term
asset.Assume, last, that the investor's short-term rate is twice his long—
term rate T.The investor will realize short only if:
(3)(i+ g(l—2Tfl(l + (I—i)a2(l—T))
>(i+g)(l+b2(I—i))(l—T) + 'r
Multiplying through and rearranging terms yields:
(1) g [a2(1—2t)(l—T) —b2(1—T)
—Iffi
>b(1—T)—a2(1—r)
If the term in brackets on the left hand side of 4) is positive,
then the left hand side is negative and the investor will realize his gain
short—term regardless of the size of his accrued gain g. This will occur when i
is small, tissmall and the expected return on asset A is much larger than that
on asset B.It is, however, not likely to occur frequently. For an investor
with a long—term tax rate of .1 and b2 equal to 0, a2 must exceed .31 or a
return of 31% per year in order to induce a realization.
If the term in brackets in (14) is negative and the right hand side
is negative, the investor will switch if:
a2(1—r) —b2(l—t) g <÷b2(l-T)-(1-2T)(1-T)—7—
Inthis more likely situation, the size of the accrued gain that will
be realized is a decreasing function of time, i, and of the tax rate I.Asthe
time the asset has been held increases, there is less time for the superior
expected return on asset A to offset the tax loss of realizing a gain
short—term.
Two opposing forces, therefore, affect the size of the average short—
term gain we expect to see realized. Price variance over time increases the
average short—term gain in an investor's portfolio while the differential tax
treatment decreases the average short—term gain that an investor can afford to
realize over time. The actual distribution of realized short—term gains will be
determined by a superposition of these two forces.
The IRS 1973 Sales of Capital Assets File provides data to analyze
this distribution. It contains detailed information on the capital gains and
losses reported on a stratified random sample of approximately 100,000 tax
returns. The sample contains information on the nature of the assets sold
including the purchase prices, the sale prices, and the dates the assets were
purchased and sold, in addition to the usual information on each tax return.
The following analysis considers realizations of corporate stock.
Approximately 30,000 taxpayers in the sample participated in over 257,000 sales
of corporate stock. Because the sample was too large to estimate economically,
every tenth taxpayer in the entire sample is included in the sample estimated
here. All transactions are deleted for which the sum of purchase price and gain
does not equal the sale price. Also, those transactions which do not report a
date of purchase or sale are not included.—8—
With these data, we can study the effect of time and the tax rate
(x's) on the size of each short—term gain (y) realized. The theory presented
above yields an intractible specification for y so two approximate specifica-
tions are used. In the first, the dependent variable is the logarithm of the
sale price divided by the purchase price of the stock (or, equivalently, ln
(l+gain/cost). This gives equal weight to large and small sales. Thus, an
investor will have the same incentive to realize stock worth $20,000 which he
bought at $10,000 as stock worth $200,000 which he bought at $100,000. This
specification also lessens the importance of those few "penny stocks" which may
have been bought for $100 and sold for $10,000. Using gain/cost magnifies their
importance and yields nonsensical results. Letting ln (sale/cost) =a+bx,
lOO.b may be interpreted as the change in gain realized as a percentage of the
sale price caused by a unitchangein x.
The ratio of gain to sale price is also used as a dependent variable.
This specification has the same "corrective" qualities as the other, but the
interpretation of the estimated coefficients is less clear. Letting gain/sale =
c+dx,l00.d may be interpreted as the change in gain realized as a percentage
of the sale price divided by the ratio of sale price to cost with a unit change
in x.
The way in which the ratio of gain to sale price (and ln(l+gain/cost))
varies with respect to the length of time an asset has been held will depend on
the relative importance of the two effects described above. If investors pay
little attention to the tax rate differences in determining the size of each
realized short—term gain, then the effect of price variance will dominate, the
ratio of gain to sale price should increase linearly with the length of time
held. To the extent that investors are locked—in, the ratio will be subject to
a downward pressure over the length of time an asset has been held.—9--
Twodifferent specifications are used for the length of time the asset
was held. The first uses five dunrnr variables for months held. These dummies
areall zero for stocks held less than one month. The second uses months held
and the square of months held where months held is the number of days held
divided by thirty. If the lock—in effect is small, the coefficient on the
square of months held will be small. If the effect is large, thecoefficient
will be significantly negative.
The previous analysis also predicts that the ratio of gain to sale
price will vary inversely with the difference in tax rates on short— and long—
term gains. Because of the various opportunities to offset gains with losses,
the choice of the relevant tax rate is a difficult one.5 The tax variable used
here is the difference between the "first dollar" marginal tax rates on short—
term and long—term capital gains. As described in Feldstein et al. (1980), the
"first dollar" capital gains tax rate is the rate that would apply to the first
dollar of corporate stock capital gain that an individual realizes. This rate
has the statistical advantage of being exogenous.
Several other variables other than the tax rate and time held should
affect the size of gains realized.
The larger an investor's portfolio, the more likely it is that he will
be able to postpone realizing large short—term gains by realizing other similar
assets. As in Feldstein et al.(1980), dividends received in 1913 are used to
represent the value of stock in an investor's portfolio. The logarithm of these
dividends is used as the independent variable so that it will not be dominated
by the largest portfolios.—10-
The more active an investor is, the more likely he is to consider
taxes when making an investment decision. The size of a gain is, therefore,
likely to be smaller for the more active investor. The logarithm of the number
of corporate stock transactions the investor undertook in 1913 is used as a
measure of investment activity.
The logarithm of AGI net of capital gains is also entered into the
equations. Its likely effect, however, is ambiguous. A lower income investor
may have to realize short—term gains in order to finance consumption while a
wealthier investor may afford to wait; the ratio of gain to sale price would
decrease with income. On the other hand, high income investors may speculate
more in short—term transactions and, so, be more likely to have large short—term
gains.
Older taxpayers might realize smaller short—terra gains because they
expect to bequeath their holdings when they die and so escape the capital gains
tax completely. Alternatively, older taxpayers are more likely to be liquidity
constrained and, so, might realize larger short—term gains. The tax return data
do not include age, but they do distinguish those returns which have one or two
individuals who are at least 65 years old. A dumniy variable is included in the
equation and given a value of one when a tax return has at least one taxpayer of
age 65 or older.
The equations are estimated using ordinary least squares61 and the
results are shown in Table 2.The coefficients on the month dummies in
Gain Sale equations 1 and 3 show that the average and ln increase for the Sale Cost
first three to four months. From this point, however, the downward pressure
exerted by the holding period distinction begins to dominate the upward pressure—11—
of time and the average gain realized decreases up to a holding period of six
months. This result strongly supports the hypothesis that investors are locked—
in to short—term capital gains.
Replacing the month dummies with month held and the square of the
month held does not change the other estimates significantly and fits the data
about as well as before. The large and significantly negative coefficient on
the square of months held strongly supports the existence of a lock—in effect.
The holding period at which the average gain realized begins to decrease is
slightly longer than 31, months.8
The tax variable has a significantly negative effect on gain—taking
behavior. Equation (3) in Table 2 predicts that an investor who faces a 25%
differentialwill realize gains that are about 12% smaller (25*.00125 divided by
.i)-6) than those realized by an investor who faces the same tax rate on both
long—and short—term gains.
Higher dividends and transactions both decrease the size of gains an
investor realizes, but the magnitudes of the estimates are small and, in
general, insignificant.
Higher income significantly increases the size of realized short—term
gains. This suggests that investors with high incomes speculate more in the
short—term than those investors with small incomes. The magnitude of the
effect, however, is small. An investor whose AGI is $500,000 will realize
short—term gains that are only one percent larger as a percentage of cost than
an investor whose AGI is $10,000.—12—
Table 2
Regression Results for Short—term Gain Realizations of Corporate Stock
Gain /Sale 100 ln. Sale Cost
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tax Rate Difference —.0510 —.0496 —.000125 —.000796
(Short —LongRate) (.0186) (.0186) (.000303) (.000303)
Month Dummies:
1—2 months 3.93 .0476
(.810) (.0132)
2—3 months 5.81 .0710
(.869) (.0141)
3—4 months 7.87 .112
(.962) (.0156)




in (AGI) .157 .166 .00243 .00258
(.0693) (.0692) (.00113) (.00113)
in(Dividends) —.237 —.228 —.00150 —.00138
(.n8) (.iii) (.00191) (.00191)
in(Transactions) —.300 —.271 —.00616 —.00586
(.272) (.271) (.00442)(.oo44i)
Age —2. 14 —2. 23 —.0332 —.03414





Constant 11. 5 9. 69 .126 .103
(1.29) (1.34) (.0209) (.0219)
Sample i68 1678 1678 1678
Mean 12.36 12.36 .146 .146
S.D. 11.96 11.96 .192 .192
R2 .0756 .0738 .0537 .0499—13—
Age, however, has a significantly negativeeffect on the size of the
short—term gains. This may indicate that the expectedopportunity to avoid
paying any capital gains tax overrides
the greater financial need of some of the
elderly. It may also indicate that older taxpayerswho can afford to invest in
the stock market have less financial need than others,and, so, can postpone
realizing gains.
Additional evidence in support of the lock—in effectis obtained by
analyzing realizations of capital gains held eightmonths or less. Seven dumnr
variables for months held are used. These dummies areall zero for stocks held
less than one month. The five other variablesused in the six month regressions
are used here as are those same fivevariables multiplied by a dummy variable
which is one if the realized gain is long—termand zero otherwise. This speci-
fication assumes that investors have differentincentives for realizing short—
term gains from those for realizing long—term gains.Table 3 presents the esti-
mates and standard errors for the month dummies.The gains which are short—term
have the same pattern as before —firstincreasing with time and then decreasing
as the holding period reaches sixmonths. The size of the average gain realized
increases tremendously as those gains become long—term.A gain realized after
being held six to seven months is73.7% larger than a gain realized after being
held five to six months.
This suggests that investors rarely realize large gainsshort—term.
Instead, the holding period distinctioninduces them to wait until the gain has
become eligible for long—term treatment._14
TABLE3
Regression Results for Gain Realizations of Corporate Stock
Held for Eight Months or Less
Gain /Sale




2-3 months 5.37 6.28
(.96) (2.19)
3—4 nnths 7.55 10.56
(1.06) (2.40)




6—7 inths 22.73 77.55
(3.02) (6.84)
—8 months 17.61 61.83
(3.03) (6.88)—15—
2.The Arguments for the Distinction
The previous section has presented evidence that supports the exist-
ence of a lock—in effect on short—term capital gains. Such an effect causes an
investor to hold a portfolio different from the one he would hold in the absence
of the holding period distinction. An investor will tend to hold his larger
short—term gains rather than subject them to unfavorable tax treatment. He nay
also obtain assets for the sole purpose of creating short—term losses. The
distinction, therefore, introduces inefficiency to capital markets and induces
an excess burden. Despite the excess burden, several arguments are proffered in
favor of differentiating between short— and long—term transactions. The most
pervasive of these argues that a distinction is necessary to distinguish short—
term speculative investment from long—term investment and its implicit commit-
ment to capital.9 In addition to discouraging speculation, the distinction has
been justified by arguing that there is no reason why assets held for a short
period of time (in most such arguments, one year) should be taxed any different-
ly than ordinary income. Last, the distinction is said to increase revenue.10
Discussion of the first argument requires a definition of speculation.
"To the extent that the distinction between speculation and investment can be
made, the difference between the two is related to the length of time an
investor expects to hold an asset."11 This somewhat amorphous distinction is
rendered more so by the existence of investments which are planned to be long—
term but which may be liquidated quickly if market conditions change, and those
investments which may be held rich longer than expected. Moreover, there is no
a priori reason to believe that speculators who switch securities regularly
provide a less useful function than those investors who do not.—16—
Ignore the ambiguity of the definition and assume, as David does, that
speculative traders conduct a large part of their business in assets held for
less than six months. Assume, furthermore, that a typical speculator makes 100
corporate stock transactions in a given year, 65 of which become gains very
quickly while 35 become losses. If the speculator is clever, which he should be
if he is a speculator, he will realize the 35 losses immediately as short—term
losses. Because a capital loss is effectively a tax credit, it alwayspays to
realize a loss whether it is short—term or long—term and then buy back the same
or some comparable stock.-2 It seems likely that of the 65 gains, the specula-
tor will be reasonably confident that some of them will still be gains after he
has held them long enough to obtain long—term treatment. The short—term losses
will offset a large portion of the short—term gains and the speculator willpay
little or no tax at the short—term rate. If the need arises, the speculator
is also more likely to create short—term losses through tax straddles. To the
extent that he can offset his short—term gains with short—term losses, the
holding period distinction is less of a deterrent to the speculator than it is
to other investors.
If the speculator should have a bad year and suffer through more loss
than gain transactions, he will have a net capital loss for the year. The
favorable treatment of' short—term loss will allow him to deduct $3,000 of his
short—term loss from income. If, instead, all transactions were treated as
long—term transactions, he would have to use $6,000 of his loss to deduct
$3,000 from income. In this case, the holding period distinction actually
encourages speculation.—11—
Although no aggregate data are available which distinguish speculators
from other investors, we may look at those investors with AGI's greater than
$100,000 who have net capital gains greater than $10,000. Those ticlevert? specu—
lators who do exist should fall into this category. In 1913, 50,000 such
investors realized some 300 million dollars in short-term gains and almost 535
million dollars in short—term losses. Clearly, many of these 50,000 investors
must have had a net short—term loss and were able to avoid paying short—term tax
rates.13 At the same time, the 1.6 million investors who had net capital gains
realized 1.1 billion dollars in short—term gains and 1.2 billion dollars in
short—term losses. The 50,000 wealthy investors, therefore, realized %ofall
short—term losses realized by net gainers, but only 30% of the short—term gains.
Although the data are not as detailed in other years as in 1973, the
experience of wealthy investors (and, arguably, speculators) ,is similar.In
1975, about 62% of returns with sales of short-term capital assets andAGI's
greater then $100,000 had a short—term capital loss. In 1911 and1978, the per-
centages were 61% and 68%, respectively, even though the holding period required
for long—term treatment, increased to 9 and then 12 months. Among those tax-
payers who did have net short—term gains, there were undoubtedlysome who had a
net long—term loss with which they were able to offset part or all of their net
short—term gain.
The data used to analyze short—term gain realizations in Section 1
provide additional evidence that speculators are not deterred by the holding
period distinction. Of the approximately 30,000 taxpayers in the original
sample, 2,99 took part in more than 20 corporate stock transactionsat least
one of which was a short—term sale. Most speculators in the sample are likely
to fall into this category. Among these "active" traders 15% had a netshort——18—
term loss for the year. Another 7% had a net short—term gain completely offset
by a net long—term loss. Only 17% of these traders paid a tax on short—terra
gains. The results are similar for those returns with more than 50 trans-
actions. This evidence suggests that the holding period distinction does little
to deter speculation.
The tendency of speculators to end the tax year with a short—term loss
is characteristic of the population as a whole. From 1973 to 1978 more tax-
payers finished the year with a net short—term capital loss than with a net
short—term capital gain. The percentage of returns with a net short—term loss
tended to increase with AGI. The differences in the dollar amounts of short—
term losses and gains were even greater. These are presented in Table 4.
Duringthose same years, the number of returns with a net capital gain was at
least twice as large as the number of returns with a net capital loss.
Thus, much of short—term capital loss was used to offset long—term capital gain.
This loss may just as well be long—term loss.
The previous paragraph points out a weakness in the argument that
short—term realizations of capital assets should be treated as ordinary income.
To the extent that investors offset long—term gains with short—term losses, the
holding period distinction is meaningless; the effective tax rate on short—term
gains is the long—term rate. The analyses in Section 1 have shown that
investors realize large gains soon after they become long—term. Yet gains that
are held for 6 months and one day are not fundamentally different from those
held 5 months and 29 days. It is also arbitrary, and perhaps hypocritical, to
treat a short—terra loss more favorably than a long—term loss when the long—term
investment required a greater "commitment to capital."Furthermore, those—19—
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investors who end the year with a net capital loss willfindthat their short—
term losses are treated more favorably than their long—term losses. And, it is
those investors in the higher tax brackets who take greater advantage of the
existence of the distinction. Those who support the holding period
distinction, therefore, on equity grounds support a distinction which is
meaningless in many cases and which causes a different kind of inequity.—21—
3. Revenue Effects
A further argument offered in support of the differential tax treat—
ment of capital gains is the revenue argument. It has been claimed
that removal of the holding period distinction will result in undue revenue
losses. The analysis in this section will show that this is untrue; in fact,
the distinction decreases the present value of revenues for some tax years.
There is no question that the existence of the distinction does
increase revenues from those taxpayers with a net short—term gain and an overall
net capital gain. Fredland et al. devoted much of their paper to determining
the amount of revenue that would be generated by lengthening the holding period
from 6 to 12 months. What they and most others seem to ignore is the existence
of large short—term losses. The holding period distinction, by treating short—
term losses more favorably than long—term losses increases loss carryover and
the amount of capital losses that can be deducted from ordinary income. Both of
these factors decrease government revenues.
To see this, assume an investor incurs a net loss of $3,000 over the
year. Under current law, the $3,000 short—termloss is deducted from income and
the $3,000 long—term loss is carried over to the next year when it can offset a
long—term gain of $3,000. For an investor with a marginal tax rateof 50% on
ordinary income, this is worth $600 (1-o% of gain taxable*50%tax rate *
$3,000).If no holding period distinction existed and all realizations were
treated as long—term transactions, the investor would have a net capital lossof
$6,000 (3,000 +3,000).He would have to use all $6,000 to deduct $3,000 from
ordinary income (since only 50%oflong—term losses are deductible from income);
the investor in this case would have no loss carryover to use for the next year.—22—
The NBER—TAXSIM program was used to estimate the relative magnitude of
the revenue effects associated with the holding period distinction. This
program applies actual United States tax laws to a weighted random sample of
over 25,000 tax returns in the specified year. The effect of any change in the
tax laws can be estimated by altering the appropriate code in the TAXSIM
program. In the simulations that follow, no attempt is made to adjust for any
changes in behavior that would be likely to occur. The simulations, therefore,
estimate the effect of removing the holding period distinction under the assump-
tion that taxpayers would have undertaken the same realizations as they actually
did. A discussion of the implications of this assumption follows the presen-
tations of the estimates.
Simulations are presented for both 1916 and 1977. In 1976, the
holding period distinction came after six months and the loss limit was $1,000
of adjusted gross income. In 1971, the corresponding figures were 9 months and
$2,000. In 1976, Standard and Poor's index of common stock prices increased by
almost 20% while in 1971, the index dipped slightly by about LL%.
Table 5 shows the estimated revenues generated by the actual laws (old—
tax) and those that would have been generated if the holding period distinction
had been removed (newtax) for 1976 and 1977. The distinction between long and
short—term transactions increased tax revenues by an estimated $81.2 million in
1976 and $105.9 million in 1917. A simulation for 1975 data, which will not be
presented here, yielded an estimated revenue increase of $68.1 million. The
increase in the length of the holding period to nine months and concomitant
increase in unprotected short—term gains is probably responsible for the larger
size of the 1911 estimate.—23—
TABLE5
Average Tax Paid in Dollars Under Existing Law and Without
a Holding Period Distinction, 1916 and 1911
1916 1917
AGI Existing No Existing No
Law Distinction Law Distinction
Under 10,000 206 206 281 281
10 —15,000 1,202 1,201 l,1t02 l,1O2
15 —20,000 2,075 2,075 2,196 2,196
20 —25,000 3,025 3,024 3,160 3,160
25 -30,000 ,262 )4,261 1,331 L,33l
30 -50,000 6,855 6,852 7,10k 7,103
50 —100,000 i,68o ii,66o 17,880 17,850
100—200,000 )-8,7o b8,620 )-6,oo 1t6,560
200 —500,000 125,100 1214,800 118,000 117,600
500 —1,000,000 311.14,100 3)42,900
- 308,700 308,100
1,000,000 + 1,20)4,000 1,202,000 1,2)48,000 1,2148,000
Total Tax





Theestimates also show that the holding period distinction has a
minimal effect on the average tax paid by taxpayers who earn less than $50,000
per year; the maximum difference between oldtax and newtax being only .0)4% for
1977 taxpayers in the $30—50,000 bracket of AGI. The incidence of the high tax
rate on short—term gains falls increasingly on wealthier taxpayers. Because
fewer than half the taxpayers have a net short—term gain over the averageyear,
a very few wealthy taxpayers pay for the increased tax revenue generated by the
existence of the holding period distinction.
Table 6 presents estimates of the loss carryover that investors
actually took in 1976 and 1971 (columns 1 and 2) and of the loss carryover they
would have taken if no holding period distinction had existed (column 3).
Column 14 gives the difference between the combined sum of actual short— and
long—term loss carryover and the long—term loss carryover that would have
resulted had there been no distinction. The difference for all returns was over
$500 million in 1916 and almost $1 billion in 1977. The investors who gain the
most, in terms of added carryover, are, again, the wealthy. The increase is
roughly proportional to AGI. The net result of the revenue effects of the
holding period distinction, however, is still to tax wealthy investors more than
less wealthy investors. The increased taxes paid on short—term gains by some
wealthy investors exceed the savings obtained via the differentiation of losses.
The results of Tables 5 and 6 indicate that removing the holding per-
iod distinction would not have decreased tax revenues, but would actually have
increased the present values of tax revenues in 1916 and 1977. In 1976,
the holding period distinction increased revenue through the taxation of—25—
Table6
Average Loss Carryover Under Existing Law and




Short—Term Long—Term New Short+Long—New
AGI Carryover Carryover Carryover Carryover
Under 10,000 35.50 11.80 i04.60 2.70
10—15,000' 30.26 42.34 68.12 3.87
15—20,000 37.19 71.7 101.1 8.39
20—25,000 17.27 94.01 105.7 6.08
25—30,000 117.6 130.8 230.1 11.1
30—50,000 116.2 710.6 865.3 21.5
50—100,000 436.3 1,603 1,992 47.3
100—200,000 1,219 3,751 4,904 66
200—500,000 4,244 5,414 9,571 81
500,000
—1,000,000 9,153 29,940 39,590 106
over 1,000,000 4,764 90,090 94,160 94
Total for Pop. 4.23922x1091.12731x101° 1.49982x101° 5.11tx108
1977
Under10,000 39.1 41.4 73.0 7.5
10—15,000' 34.16 124.19 151.62 7.3
15—20,000 203.6 139.0 321.6 15
20—25,000 9.36 98.01 102.1 5.33
25—30,000 23.76 44.56 51.81 10.51
30—50,000 211.6 350.4 527.1 34.9
50—100,000 i,i86 1,259 2,369 76
100—200,000 1,692 2,802 4,365 129
200—500,000 2,322 5,628 1,811 139
500,000 2,982 i4,oo 16,910 142
—1,000,000
over 1,000,000 47,630 68,960 116,400 190
Total for Pop. 7.752x109 1.032l2x1010 1.70914x101° 9.82x108—26—
short—term gains by $81.2 million; at the same time, it created $51)- million in
extra loss carryover. Assuming that these extra losses will be used to offset
long—term gains, the application of investors' marginal tax rates on long—term
gains yields an approximate value for the added loss carryover of $83.6
miliion.1I While the size of this estimate must be discounted bysome yearly
rate of time preference, several factors require that the estimate be inflated.
The marginal tax rates which were applied were those of married taxpayers filing
jointly —thelowest rates applicable. Because all returns are included in the
sample, this underestimates the true rates. Thxpayers who have a net capital
loss are also likely to be below their permanent incomes and are subject to a
lower marginal rate than usual. Loss carryovers, furthermore, certainly offset
short—term as well as long—term gains and are, thus, more valuable than is
assumed in the simulation. It would seem that the value of $83.6 million is a
minimum value and is likely to be an underestimate. This suggests that in 1976,
the holding period distinction did not increase the present value of government
revenues and probably decreased them.
In 1917, both the holding period and the amount of losses deductible
from income increased. This and the decrease in stock prices over theyear
caused the net revenue effect of the distinction to become a negative one. The
distinction increased revenue by $105.9 million while the $982 in extracarry-
over of losses cost the government an estimated $142.5 million. The government
lost, therefore, at least $40 million in 1977 because of the holding period
distinction.—27—
The behavioral responses of investors to the removal of the holding
period distinction are likely to increase the tax collected even further.
First, removal of the distinction should result in a very small increase in
realized gains over the year. To see this, assume a holding period of 12 months
is required for long term treatment. Investor A has a stock which he bought at
a price, P0' and is worth P6 after six months and p12 after 12 inths. With the
holding period distinction, investor A realizes his gain after 12 months and
pays a tax on P12 —Po•Without the distinction, investor A sells his stock to
investor B and pays a tax on P6 —p0.If, six months later, investor B sells
her stock, she pays a tax on P12 —P6In both cases, the treasury receives
taxes paid on P12 —p0
.Thepresent value of the basis, however, will be at
least as large without the distinction than with it. The tax paid on the first
transaction (P6 —p)may be paid in an earlier tax year than the taxes paid on
the other two transactions. To the extent that the holding period distinction
slows the rate of turnover of assets, the present value of the bases and taxes
paid decreases.
Realized losses in a given year are likely to decrease slightly. The
value of the tax offset obtained from realizing a loss is smaller for long—term
than for short—term losses. The removal of the distinction causes all losses to
be long—term. Because the incentive is smaller to realize a long—term loss than
a short—term loss fewer loss realizations should be observed. Furthermore, the
need to engage in tax straddles which create artificial short—term capital
losses to offset short—term capital gains will be greatly reduced. This should
also decrease the number of losses realized in a given year. Both the slight
decrease in losses realized and slight increase in gains realized will tend to
increase revenue if the holding period distinction is removed. This strengthens—28—
the argument that the distinction does not increase governmentrevenues, but,
may actually decrease them.—29—
4.Conclusion
This paper has studied the holding perioddistinction of the capital
gains tax. The analyses of the firstsection of the this paper used both
aggregate and micro data to show that thedistinction is a great deterrent
to the realization of short—term capital gains.Investors are induced to hold
such gains longer than they would in the absenceof the distinction.
An examination of the arguments commonly presentedto justify the
distincbion and concomitant inefficiency shows themto be of questionable merit.
The holding period distinction does little to discouragespeculation and does
not increase government revenue.Notes
See Minarik (1981) for a history of the capital gains tax and therelevant
holding period. From l9L2 to 1976, that holding period was six months. In
1977, it was increased to nine months and, in 1978, to the current oneyear.
2 These ratesare clouded by the existence of the maximum tax and minimum tax.
See Minarik (1981) and David (1968) for the exact treatment ofcapital gains.
3 Currently, the short—termrate is 2.5 times the long—term rate. Before 1978,
the short rate was twice the long rate and this relationship is chosenfor
simplicity's sake. This does not alter the results.
Available on request. For a different treatment of the lock—in effect
induced by the holding period distinction, see David (1968),pp. 128—O.
5 See Minarik (1981) fora discussion of this problem.
6 Insteadof ordinary least squares, Minarik (1981) weighted his regression
with the sample weights. Although this introduces heteroscedasticity, it
eliminates the bias that is introduced by sampling according to AGI's.
Because of this, returns with larger capital gains are more likely to be
sampled. The estimates obtained using a weighted regression on the data used
in this paper, however, are almost the same as the OLS estimates.
7 Regressionswere also run to check for heteroscedasticity over time that is
suggested by Figure 1.The square root of months held was used as a weight.
The estimates and their standard errors, also, are almost thesame as
those obtained using OLS.
8
Stewart Myers suggested that the results might depend on the performance of
the stock market over the period during which a stock was held. To test for—2—
Notes
this, dummies were included for the month a stock was purchased. Again, the
estimates are almost the same as the OLS estimates.
9 See David (1968), p. 28, Fredland etal. (1968), p. U.S. Legislative
History —1916,p. 2,901.
10 See David (1968), p. 29 and Fredland et al. (1968).
Fredland et al. (1968), p. Alsosee David (1968), pp. 28—29.
12 See Constantinides (1980). To be more precise, the value of the tax credit
must exceed the transaction costs. These costs are likely to be small for
speculators.
13 See 1973 Sales of Capital Assets, p. 68.









15See David (1968), p. 139.